Misuse of Radioactive Materials

Misuse of Radioactive Materials

Misuse of Radioactive Materials

The risks linked to possible diversion or threft, for military or terrorist purpooses, of nuclear material used in the civil sector either for power production or for industrial, medical and research purposes are minimized by action taken by the IAEA and by countries concerned.

Diversion by Countries

IAEA was created in 1957 to verify the fulfillment of countries' political obligations under international agreements related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Such obligations may result from the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (83) or, for non-signatory countries, from safeguard agreements dealing with nuclear material or facilities, equipment or other materials. In addition, the countries with nuclear weapons have accepted the implementation of IAEA safeguards on their territories as part of voluntary offers specific to each country (this offer can apply to the whole of the nuclear power programme or be restricted to certain materials or facilities). IAEA uses experience acquired to adapt safeguards so that they are applicable to countries that have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The safeguards applicable to countries that have signed the Treaty are defined in an IAEA document (84). This sets quantifiable technical objectives for the timely detection of the diversion of significant quantities of nuclear materials from peaceful nuclear activities to a manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or for purposes unknown, and for deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection. The safeguards system is essentially bases on the practice of accounting for nuclear materials, together with two impotanat measures: containment (physical barriers, vessions, locks, seals, etc) and direct surveillance or instrument-based surveillance.

Source: Nuclear Power & Health