The Nuclearisation Process

The Nuclearisation Process

Nuclearisation is a long and complex process covering a number of stages. It begins at mining uranium and ends in exploding a bomb. The process once again poses a strong challenge to all life on our planet as a result of the revival of the nuclear energy.

During the process the ratio of uranium to the ore is only .02%. Ore undergoes various stages of purification to merely produce a tiny amount of uranium. The purified uranium concentrate at its primary stage is known as yellow cake. This is again purified in the nuclear plants to make it suitable for the use in nuclear weapons. After uranium is extracted the left-over ore, called uranium tailings, is mixed with water and flushed into the tailing dams. The ore from which uranium is taken out has a number of radioactive minerals and 85% of those elements continue to exist in the ore which are drained out in the water bodies. A few of them are thorium-230, radium-226, radon-222 the radon progeny including 210, etc. Tailings also have concentration of lead, zinc, manganese, cadmium and arsenic. Since there is no decay process the radiation effect of these elements remains active thousands of years. These radioactive minerals along with the ore/uranium tailings keep contaminating the natural water bodies over a very large area. Eventually, these radioactive minerals enter into the food chain through polluted water used in agriculture, aquaculture and domestic purposes. The solid radioactive materials in the ore attach themselves to tiny duty particles and droplets of water vapour floating in the air. The nuclearisation as a process thus contaminates groundwater, surface water, seas, oceans and air.

The second stage is transportation of purified uranium or yellow cake to the processing industries. Uranium in the stage of yellow cake' is generally dealt with less care and by unskilled or semi-skilled workers. Due to rigid fail-safe measures the containers conveying uranium sometimes burst or leak and thus remain to vulnerable to accidental risks.

During the processing of uranium, radioactive iodine is routinely released in small amounts by nuclear power plants and in huge amounts by nuclear reprocessing plants. Decommissioning and cleaning up of nuclear weapons plants also produce extra large amounts of radioactive waste. It is estimated that a disproportionate share of this burden falls on indigenous and rural people who live in the areas of processing and who are employed in nuclear industries as workers.

Misuse of Radioactive Materials

Misuse of Radioactive Materials

Misuse of Radioactive Materials

The risks linked to possible diversion or threft, for military or terrorist purpooses, of nuclear material used in the civil sector either for power production or for industrial, medical and research purposes are minimized by action taken by the IAEA and by countries concerned.

Diversion by Countries

IAEA was created in 1957 to verify the fulfillment of countries' political obligations under international agreements related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Such obligations may result from the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (83) or, for non-signatory countries, from safeguard agreements dealing with nuclear material or facilities, equipment or other materials. In addition, the countries with nuclear weapons have accepted the implementation of IAEA safeguards on their territories as part of voluntary offers specific to each country (this offer can apply to the whole of the nuclear power programme or be restricted to certain materials or facilities). IAEA uses experience acquired to adapt safeguards so that they are applicable to countries that have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The safeguards applicable to countries that have signed the Treaty are defined in an IAEA document (84). This sets quantifiable technical objectives for the timely detection of the diversion of significant quantities of nuclear materials from peaceful nuclear activities to a manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or for purposes unknown, and for deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection. The safeguards system is essentially bases on the practice of accounting for nuclear materials, together with two impotanat measures: containment (physical barriers, vessions, locks, seals, etc) and direct surveillance or instrument-based surveillance.

Source: Nuclear Power & Health